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III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Respondent maintains that Petitioner is responsible to pay
taxes for materials purchased

by the Alpine School District

("Alpine") and installed by Petitioner into a building constructed
by Alpine.

Despite Change Orders to the Petitioner's contract

which specifically deleted any responsibility to furnish materials
that were directly ordered, paid for and purchased by Alpine, the
Respondent argues that the Petitioner had a "furnish and install
contract" with respect to such materials.

However, the only

evidence in the record shows that Petitioner's obligations to
furnish materials were amended by Change Order.
Dennis

Cecchini,

the

Architect

on

the

Further, Mr.

Project

who

had

responsibility to interpret contract documents, provided the sole
testimony with respect to the effect of the Change Orders - the
Change Orders amended the Petitioner's contract from a "furnish
and install" contract to an "installation only" contract.
The Petitioner also maintains that under prior case law this
Court is bound to impose a tax on the "consumer" of materials, that
is, whoever last uses the materials by installing them into a
physical structure.

However, this interpretation is inconsistent

with the Utah Supreme Court's position in Chicago
Company

v.

State

Tax Commission,

Bridge

& Iron

196 Utah Adv.Rep. 18 (Sept. 30,

1992) which states that the alternative "consumer" analysis urged
by Respondent applies only where the real property contractor
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"purchases building materials11 for installation.
cited

by

the Respondent

are readily

All of the cases

distinguishable

from

the

present case on the following grounds: (1) the contractor in each
of these cases purchased and paid for the materials on which the
sales tax was imposed whereas in this case it is undisputed that
Alpine ordered, paid for and purchased the materials in question;
and (2) none of the cases cited by Respondent involved a contractor
whose contract was amended
materials

from

the

by change order to delete

contract

so

that

the

contractor

certain
had

no

responsibilities other than those incident to installation with
respect to such materials.

This case is very different from the

cases relied upon by the Respondent in this matter.
Finally, Respondent argues that Alpine was somehow the "agentff
of the Petitioner with respect to purchases of materials. However,
this argument

is unsupported

by any evidence and none of the

incidents of agency are present to support this wild assertion.
IV.
CORRECTION OF RESPONDENTS STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent has misstated and selectively asserted facts in
this matter.

The Respondent observes that the Petitioner provided

to Alpine a list which enumerated building materials which could
be purchased at a savings of over $1,000.00 if purchased tax free
(Respondent Brief, p. 4) .

However, the Respondent fails to note

that the list was provided so that Alpine, a tax exempt entity,
could determine which materials to directly purchase. Further, the
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Respondent has simply misconstrued the relevant facts by failing
to place them into the relevant context.

The Respondent asserts

that "Petitioner bore the burdens and risks of ownership of the
material once it was delivered to the job site.

Petitioner still

bore the burden to furnish and install the materials under the
contract."

(Final Decision, 525, R.13).

There is nothing in the

record to support the finding that Petitioner still bore the burden
to

"furnish

and

install" material under the contract.

The

Respondent completely ignores the fact and effect of the Change
Order to the Petitioner's contract which expressly removed from
Petitioner any responsibility to furnish materials which Alpine
determined it would order, pay for and purchase directly.
The only contract in evidence in this matter is included in
the Record as Exhibit "p-i" - a contract dated February 20, 1986.
This contract did not include any of the materials for which the
sales tax was assessed against Petitioner.

The materials which

Alpine had determined it would purchase were deleted from the
Petitioner's

contract.

Further, Alpine's

obligation

to pay

Petitioner for the sale price of the materials was deleted from the
contract price.

Mr. Cecchini, the Project Architect who had

responsibility to interpret the various contract documents with
respect to the Project, testified as an expert witness that the
signing of this amended contract (the "Change Order") had the same
effect as a change order (Tr. 138-139, 157.) Mr. Cecchini further
explained that the Change Order to the Contract removed all
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responsibility from the Petitioner with respect to furnishing any
of the materials that would be directly purchased by the Alpine.
The Petitionees only responsibility as a result of the Change
Order was to install the materials purchased by Alpine (Tr. 138139, 144, 154-155, 160, 175.)

The only testimony in the entire

record as to the effect of the Change Order was provided by the
Petitioner.

This testimony

establishes that the

Petitioner's

"furnish and install contract" was amended to an "installation
only" contract with respect to materials purchased by Alpine. As
a result of the Change Order, Alpine retained the administrative,
supervisory and purchasing functions of the General Contractor with
respect to such materials (Add. 52, 59-62, 67-68, Tr. 25-26, 7476, 81, 95, 135-141, 163, 172; Holden Depo. at 10-16; Finding of
Fact at 4, Add. 2-5.)

The Petitioner testified that he had a

similar understanding.1
V.
ARGUMENT
A.

1.

AN AMENDMENT DELETING CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS TO
FURNISH MATERIALS TO BE PURCHASED DIRECTLY BY A
TAX EXEMPT ENTITY QUALIFIES FOR THE SALES TAX
EXEMPTION
The Tax Commissions Findings with Respect to Contract
Interpretation are Reviewed for Correction of Error.
The Respondent claims that the Tax Commission's findings are

entitled to deference.

However, the Tax Commission's findings

ignore the only evidence in the record with respect to the Change

*See Addendum 1 attached hereto and by this referenced made a part hereof.
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Order and its effect as to interpretation of the scope of duties
of the Petitioner.

The Tax Commission relies primarily upon its

interpretation of the agreements of the parties as the basis for
its finding.

(See Rec. 20-25, 55 15-22)

However, it is well

established under Utah law that interpretation of contract is a
question of law. Morris
Co.,

v. Mountain

States

658 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1983).

Telephone

and

Telegraph

The Commission's finding

based on interpretation of the contract documents is therefore
entitled to no deference and should be reviewed de novo

by this

Court.
Further, the Petitioner's argument that the "Petitioner still
bore the burden to furnish and install the materials under the
contract" notwithstanding the Change Order is unsupported by any
evidence at all in the record.

The Respondent cites the Tax

Commission's Findings to establish that the Change Order did not
alter Petitioner's obligations from a "furnish and install" to an
"installation only" contract.

(See Respondent's Brief at 5.)

However, the Tax Commission's

finding

is an erroneous legal

conclusion as to the effect of the Change Order as executed by the
parties.

The Tax Commission found: "the Change Orders which were

executed did not relieve the Petitioner of its duty to furnish
materials,

so

the

contract

contract." (R. 12, f25)
evidence in the record.

remained

a

furnish

and

install

This Finding is not based upon any
Further, the sole evidence in the record

with respect to the effect of the Change Order expressly supports
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the opposite conclusion: the Change Order deleted from Petitioner's
contract any duties with respect to materials other than to install
them into Alpine's building and duties attendant thereto. The Tax
Commission's finding is not entitled to any deference because: (1)
it constitutes a legal conclusion which interprets the legal effect
of change orders; (2) there is absolutely no evidence in the record
as to the effect

of the Change Order was to

support this

conclusion; (3) the sole evidence in the record provided by Mr.
Dennis Cecchini who is an expert with respect to interpretation of
construction agreements and is expressly to the contrary.
2. Tax Exempt Owners Who Employ Change Orders to
Directly Purchase Materials Qualify for Tax
Exemption.
As the Tax Commission stated in its final decision in this
matter, if an exempt owner purchases and installs materials itself,
there is no question that the purchase is exempt from Sales tax.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(2), (8). (Final Decision, R. 13-14, fl3)
Moreover, if an exempt entity purchases materials and then enters
a contract with a contractor to install the materials, again, no
sales tax is imposed on the purchase.

Id.

There should also be no sales tax incident to an exempt
entity's purchase of materials in a situation where the entity
contracts with a contractor to furnish materials but then elects,
through execution of a change order to the contract, to purchase
materials itself and then deduct the cost of the materials and
related sales tax from the original contract bid.
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The effect of

executing a change order is a critical point that should be given
much more weight than that given by the Tax Commission.
The Change Order completely altered the legal relationship
between the parties and cannot be underestimated in determining the
outcome of this case.

Prior to executing the Change Order, Alpine

looked to the Contractor to furnish materials and install them in
a completed project.

The execution of the Change Order, however,

changed the legal arrangement between the parties as follows:
(1) The Petitioner no longer is responsible to purchase the
materials listed on the Change Order;
(2) The bid price is reduced by the cost of the materials plus
sales tax thereon;
(3) Alpine is now the purchaser of the materials;
(4) Provisions in the contract imposing various duties on the
Contractor

for

materials

the

Contract

otherwise

would

have

furnished are no longer applicable and legally cannot be relied on
by Alpine against the Contractor;
(5) The

risks

and

responsibilities

materially expanded in many ways (See

Also

of

Alpine

have

been

Part A(4) below).

Legally and practically, an exempt entity's purchases through
change order are the same as purchases made directly.

However, the

Tax Commission has chosen to make a distinction between the two and
impose stringent
Commission's

rules upon change order purchases.

stance

is

unfortunate
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because

the

The Tax

form

of

a

transaction should not affect the taxable results, so long as the
substance is present.
3.

Imposing
Contractual
Duties
and
Responsibilities
on
Contractors as to Goods Purchased by Exempt Owners Does Not
Affect the Tax Exempt Status of a Sale.
The Tax Commission has expressed concern about contracts that

impose on contractors duties related to materials purchased and
furnished by exempt owners, such as agreement in advance with a
contractor to perform ordering, receiving, handling, securing and
similar

duties

in

connection

with

the materials.

The Tax

Commission has indicated that these contractual duties may deprive
an exempt owner's purchases of materials from sales tax exempt
status. (Final Order, R. 20) In modern day construction practice,
however, not only are exempt owners prudent in seeking help from
parties with greater construction expertise and resources, but
exempt owners could also be dangerously exposed absent contractors
assuming such contractual duties.

If a contractor defectively

installs materials furnished by an exempt owner, absent contractual
language protecting the exempt owner, the contractor may be able
to shift the responsibility back to the owner.
Contractual provisions requiring some delegated contractor
accountability for proper care and use of owner-furnished materials
attempt to ensure that the contractor will perform its duties to
install owner-furnished materials as responsibly and carefully as
with materials furnished and consumed by the contractor.

These

contractual provisions, however, are not intended to remove from
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the exempt owner the risks, prerogatives and responsibilities of
owning the materials.

For example, Alpine expressly assumes the

responsibilities and risks associated with ordering, insuring the
correct number, quality and timely delivery of materials to the
Project site.

(Tr. 140-141,)

These duties Petitioner had prior

to the Change Order.
Also,

in many

cases

involving

exempt

owner purchasers,

contract provisions meant to cover contractor-furnished materials
are not intended to apply to exempt-owner furnished materials,
based on change orders between the parties and the express conduct
of the parties which further modifies their written contract,
particularly if that conduct extends over long periods of time.
A leading treatise on Contracts states:
[Innumerable cases show that the fact that a contract
has been put into express words does not prevent the
meaning and legal operation of those words from being
affected by process of ximplication1 from the conduct of
the parties and from surrounding circumstances . . . A
promisor, even though his promise has been put into clear
words, can always add to it, modify it or wholly replace
it by a subsequent tacit agreement, one in which his own
promises are found wholly by inference from conduct other
than words.
Corbin

on Contracts

§ 564 (3d ed. 1979).

This Court has espoused this doctrine.
Benedict's

Hospital,

In Eie

v.

St.

638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981), the Court

stated:
Though arguably clear on its face, where the parties
demonstrate by their actions that to them the contract
meant something quite different, the intent of the
parties will be enforced.
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See also

Bullough

Bullfrog

Marina

v.
v.

Sims,

Lentz,

16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965); and
28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972).

An exempt owner cannot claim exemption from sales tax when it
in substance is not the purchaser and owner of materials, and in
effect has merely taken steps to give the appearance of ownership
without assuming the requisite risk of loss. However, there should
be a balance.
benefits

and

Although an exempt owner must possess sufficient
burdens

to be deemed

owner

and

consumer

of the

construction materials, the Tax Commission must be objective in
recognizing those benefits and burdens before dismissing them as
a mere "paper trail."
A fair and workable interpretation of the exemption statute
would require that exempt owners demonstrate that they are owners
and consumers of the materials for which no sales tax is paid.

A

rebuttable presumption of ownership and consumption should be made
when (1) the contract between the exempt owner and the contractor
authorizes an otherwise furnish-and-install contract to be amended
by change order, (2) the exempt owner executes change orders to
reflect the materials purchased, and (3) the exempt owner executes
purchase orders and checks for payment on its own stationary and
in its own name.
4.

Whenever an Owner Becomes the Direct Purchaser of Materials,
the Relative Legal Duties of the Owner, Contractor and Seller
are Changed.
Whenever

an owner purchases materials

for a

construction

project by executing purchase orders and signing checks, the legal
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relationships of the parties to the transaction are dramatically
changed.

The owner steps into privity of contract with the

supplier and at the same time, the contractor ceases to be in
privity with the supplier.
The following are some examples of the potential impact of
these changes.
contract

The Uniform Commercial Code may not apply to the

between

the

contractor

and

the

owner, because the

contractor's obligation will no longer include the purchased goods.
See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-210 (1990) (UCC applies to transactions
in goods).2

Thus, a whole array of express and implied warranties

may no longer apply in the relationship between the exempt owner
and contractors.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-313, -314 and -315

(1990) (express and implied warranties under UCC).

At the same

time, as buyer, the exempt owner will have those warranty rights
in relationship to the supplier of goods.
Counteracting these newly gained rights, an owner who becomes
a buyer loses rights under the UCC upon accepting the goods. See
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602.

Furthermore, by becoming a direct

purchaser, the owner may waive other contract rights.

By giving

up (through change order or otherwise) the contract right to have
the contractor purchase building materials, the owner may impliedly

2

The Tenth Circuit, applying Utah law, held that the UCC applied to a construction contract involving
the supply of materials. See Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp, 451 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir.
1971); accord Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co. 532 F.2d 572, 579-82 (7th Cir.
1976); Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 957-60 (8th Cir. 1974).

-
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waive legal claims or defenses —

or be held to be partially

responsible under Utah's comparative negligence statute should the
purchased product fail or cause harm.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-

27-37, -38, -40 and -43 (1986).
In sum, when an owner buys its own building materials, that
transaction has legal significance.

To dismiss such involvement

as a mere "paper trail" is to ignore the array of legal rights and
duties existing between owners, contractors and suppliers in
building construction.
B.

THE IDENTITY OF THE PURCHASER CONTROLS ENTITLEMENT
TO TAX EXEMPT STATUS UNDER UTAH STATUTES.
The Respondent argues that it is not sufficient to identify

the purchaser of the materials; rather, if a contractor is involved
at any stage in actually physically placing materials into a
physical structure, then the contractor has "used" those materials
and the contractor must be deemed to be the "consumer" of the
materials and therefore the person responsible to pay the tax
therefor.

(Respondent's Brief, 10-12.)

However, if Respondent's

line of reasoning were adopted, then the contractor would remain
responsible even if it merely installs materials into a physical
structure under an "installation only" contract.

Indeed, a tax

exempt entity could never qualify for a tax exemption unless the
tax exempt entities' own employees acted as the General Contractor
who directly installed the materials into physical facilities
without using any subcontractors to perform the work.

The State

Tax Code simply does not require such extreme measures to qualify
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for the sales tax exemption.

Rather, the state sales tax imposes

the burden of tax upon the "purchaser" of the material.

If the

purchaser is a tax exempt entity then the sales tax is not owed
under UCA §59-12-104(2).
The Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Chicago
Iron

Company

v.

State

Tax Commission,

Bridge &

196 Utah Adv.Rep. 18 (Sept.

30, 1992) is instructive as to the identity of the taxable event
and the entity to be taxed for sales tax.

The Utah Supreme Court

stated:
Sales taxes are imposed on retail sales of tangible
personal property that take place in Utah. Utah Code
Ann. § 59-14-4(a) (Supp. 1984 & Supp. 1985). Use taxes
are imposed on the storage, use, or consumption of
tangible personal property purchased outside the state
for storage, use or consumption in Utah. Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-16-3(a) (Supp. 1985).

When purchasing raw materials, a manufacturer does not
engage in a retail sales transaction. The theory of the
statutory scheme is that tangible personal property used
in manufacturing or fabrication should be taxed once, and
only once. That one-time taxable event occurs when the
sales tax is levied on the price of the finished product
sold at retail, since the value of the component parts is
included in that price.
However, when tangible personal property is sold for
incorporation into real property, as opposed to another
item of personal property, different rules apply. For
example, one who purchases building materials for use in
constructing homes, highways and the like, is a xreal
property contractor,' and the contractor's purchases of
tangible personal property used for such purposes are
taxable transactions under sales tax law.
(citations
omitted.)
In effect, a real property contractor is
treated as a consumer for sales tax purposes.
The reason for this rule is that materials which are
purchased and then converted into real property would
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escape the sales tax because sales tax is not imposed on
the sale of real property. Real property contractors are
therefore considered the consumers because their
purchases of materials that are incorporated into real
property are the last transactions in which the materials
can be subjected to the sales tax.
Id.

19-2 0.

It is important to note that the "taxable event" defined by
the Utah Supreme Court is the "real property contractor's purchase"
of building materials "on the price of the product sold at retail."
Id

at 19. The tax falls on the person "who purchases building

materials."

Id.

at 20.

It follows that if the purchase is made

by a tax exempt entity rather than a real property contractor, the
taxable event is exempt from the sales tax.

The Court's entire

analysis emphasizes the identity of the purchaser of the materials.
The alternative rule which deems a real property contractor to be
the "consumer" does not come into effect unless the contractor
purchases the materials for incorporation into a structure.
This position is consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's
statement in Utah Concrete

Products

Corp. v. State

Tax Comm'n, 101

Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408, 411 (1942) wherein the Court stated:
It is true that under this section sales made directly by
plaintiffs to the state would be exempted, but in the
instant case the sales are to an independent contractor
and not to an agent of the state.
Rule 865-19-585(4) also provides that sales of materials to
tax exempt institutions are exempt if sold as tangible personal
property and the material supplier does not install the materials
as improvements to realty.

If the exempt entity
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purchases

materials and the seller does not install them, no sales tax is
due.
The Respondent relies upon Hardy

v.

State

Tax Commission,

561

P.2d 1064, 1054 (Utah 1977) for the proposition that sales tax
"should be paid on the sale of any personal property in the state
somewhere along the line between its production and consumption.11
(Res. Brief, 10) However, this assertion, without qualification,
simply assumes that no tax exemption applies and that a state tax
sale must be paid somewhere along the line between purchase and
installation into a physical structure.
State

Tax

Commission

However, the Hardy

v.

case is readily distinguishable from the

present case because Hardy did not deal with a situation where a
tax exempt entity directly purchased the materials and delivered
the materials to a subcontractor for installation into a physical
structure.
The Respondent relies upon Utah

Tax

Commission,

Construction

Co.

Concrete

101 Ut. 513, 125 P.2d
v.

State

Tax

Commission,

408

Products,

v.

State

(1942); and

Olsen

12 Ut.2d 42, 361 P.2d

1112 (1961) for the assertion that tax liability falls upon the
contractor who is deemed to be the f•ultimate consumer.f'

Such a

rule may be applicable to situations where the contractor actually
purchases the materials in question and installs them into a
physical structure. However, such a rule does not apply where the
tax exempt entity purchases the materials. Where a tax exempt
entity hires a subcontractor to install materials which the tax
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exempt

entity

has purchased,

the

tax

exempt

entity

is the

"purchaser" and the "ultimate consumer" within the meaning of the
tax exemption for sales tax purposes.
The Respondent relies especially upon Tummurru Trades,
Utah State

Tax Commission,

Inc.

v.

802 P.2d 715 (Ut. 1990), wherein a Utah

Building Contractor who actually purchased

items of tangible

personal property and sent the items out of state to be installed
into physical structures was held liable for the Utah sales tax.
The Court correctly held that the tax was due on the "sale" of the
property in Utah to the party who ultimately installed the property
to property located outside of Utah.

However, the facts of the

Tummurru matter are very different from the present case.

In the

present case, Alpine (not Petitioner) purchased the materials in
question.

Unlike the contractor in Tummurru,

Alpine and not

Petitioner ordered, received and directly paid for the materials
that were placed into the School District's building.
does not apply

in this case

for the reasons

The use tax

set

forth in

Petitioner's Brief and to which Respondent has failed entirely to
respond.

(See Petitioner's Brief, 28-30)

Because the non-exempt

contractor in Tummurru purchased, took possession of the materials
in the State of Utah and later installed them to real property, the
sales were not tax exempt even though the conversion to real
property occurred out of state.

Had an exempt entity such as

Alpine been the purchaser in Tummurru, no sales tax would have been
due.
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The Respondent holds that the "ultimate consumer" is the
entity responsible for the tax.

(Respondent's Brief at 12.)

The

Respondent defines an "ultimate consumer" to be that person or
entity which ultimately places the materials into a physical
structure.
Tax

However, this position is inconsistent event with the

Commission's

own

rules which

expressly

provide

that an

"installation only" contractor is not responsible for sales tax
where the owner is a tax exempt entity. The Respondent's position
is therefore incoherent.
inconsistent

even with

Respondent's

analysis

Indeed, the Respondent's position is
the Tax

would

Commission's

make

any

position.

person

or

entity

The
who

physically places materials into a structure to be the entity
subject to sales tax.

However, the Tax Commission has expressly

and by rule recognized that the tax should not be imposed where the
tax exempt entity controls the purchase of the materials and merely
hires out the installation of the materials.
58SA.4.

See Rule R865-19-

That is precisely what Alpine has done in this case with

respect to the Petitioner.

Thus, the "transactional analysis" in

which Respondent engages is inconsistent with both statute and the
Tax Commission's rules.
The Respondent admits that the tax may not have been "due when
the materials were acquired," yet the Respondent maintains that
"there was a subsequent taxable event; the use, storage and
consumption of the material by the Petitioner."
Brief at 14).

(Respondent's

However, if the mere taking possession of materials
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after delivery to the construction site constitutes a "taxable
event," then even installation only contracts will be subject to
the state sales tax.

The Project Architect, Mr. Dennis Cecchini

testified

installation

that

all

only

contractors

must

take

possession and control of materials during the time they are being
used to be incorporated into a physical structure pursuant to the
(Tr. at 139-140)3

installation only contract.

Both the Tax

Commission and the Respondent have simply ignored the effect of the
Change Order to the Petitioner's contract with respect to the
Petitioner's scope of responsibilities.

The effect was to remove

from the Petitioner's contract any responsibility to order and
coordinate timely delivery of the proper number and quantity of
materials that were to be purchased directly by Alpine.
responsibilities

retained

by

the

Petitioner

included

The only
taking

possession of the materials once delivered to the site for purposes
of installation into the school building.

All of the duties

undertaken by the Petitioner with respect to owner purchased
materials

were

consistent

with

the

Petitioner

having

an

"installation only" contract. Under the Tax Commission's rules and
interpretation of the statute, such an installation only contract
does not subject the Petitioner to the state sales tax; rather, the
purchasing tax exempt entity is deemed to be the "purchaser" and
the sales tax exemption is available to such an entity.

3

See Addendum 3 attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof.
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The

Petitioner does not become a "consumer" merely because he installs
material into a physical structure.
C.

THE ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT DID NOT ACT
PETITIONER'S AGENT WHEN PURCHASING MATERIALS

AS

In a rather desperate attempt to escape the exemption from
sales tax where an exempt entity is the actual purchaser of the
material, the Respondent asserts that Alpine "was Petitioner's
purchasing agent."

The claim that Alpine purchased materials as

an agent at least constitutes an admission that Alpine purchased
the materials.

(Respondents Brief at p. 22.)

Further, such a

legal conclusion does not square with the facts.

An agency

relationship can exist only where the principal exercises control
over the agent.

Title

Insurance,

contractual
Petitioner

Zions

First

National

Bank

v. National

American

749 P.2 651, 654 (Utah 1988). There was never any

agreement
contracted

between
as

Petitioner

a subcontractor

and
only

Alpine; rather
with Poulsen-

Ellsworth Construction Company, the general contractor on the job.
(Tr. 33-34)

Alpine, not the Petitioner, controlled ordering

materials, determining the appropriate quantity, quality, place and
time for delivery. The Alpine School District, not the Petitioner,
decided in its sole discretion which materials it would directly
purchase using its own funds.

(Stipulated Fact 12, Add. 42;

Finding of Fact 3-4, 8; Add. 2-5; 52, 59-62, 67-68; Tr. 25-26, 7476, 81, 95, 135-141, 163, 172.)

The Petitioner had absolutely no

role or say in the design, the budget, the scope, the materials
called for in the plans and specifications, or the critical path
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(time table) of the Project.

Only Dr. Jacklin could authorize

payment of materials by the School District (Stipulated Facts,
533) . There is no evidence in the record even remotely suggesting
that Petitioner had authority to bind Alpine with respect to any
particular supplier or materials to be purchased.

Specifically,

the Tax Commission found:
Dr. Jacklin visited the project site in the accompany of
the project architect at least weekly during the
construction period. He was ultimately responsible to
authorize the
issuance of purchase
orders for
construction materials on behalf of the School District.
Mr. Sherm Wankier, the Purchasing Agent and an employee
of the School District, was directly responsible to fill
out purchase orders on behalf of the School District and
to sent them to suppliers of materials for the project.
(R. 12, f21 of Final Findings).
Thus, the Tax Commission recognized that Alpine employees Dr.
Jacklin and Sherm Wankier had ultimate responsibility with respect
to authorization of purchase of construction materials and payment
therefore. The Tax Commission recognized Mr. Sherm Wankier as the
purchasing agent on the Project.

The Respondent's position is

contradicted by the Tax Commission's findings in this case.
The Petitioner never authorized Alpine to act on his behalf;
rather, Alpine determined in its sole discretion to authorize the
Change Order which changed the scope of Petitioner's contractual
duties to Alpine on the Project.
purchasing

process

by

determining

purchased,

filling

out

purchase

Alpine controlled the entire
which
orders

materials
for

would

be

such materials,

inspecting them upon receipt, and making checks directly paid to
the material supplier. The only role Petitioner had in the entire
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project with respect to owner purchased materials was to take
possession of them and install them into the physical structure.
No other reading of the contract is consistent with the Change
Order removing the materials to be purchased by Alpine. Because any
responsibility
deleted

to furnish the Alpine purchased materials was

from the contract under the amendment, there

is no

possibility that Petitioner nevertheless had responsibility to
direct Alpine's performance with respect to such purchases.4
There

is nothing

in Alpine's

purchasing

activity

suggests that it acted as Petitioner's "purchasing agent."

which
The

procedure for purchasing materials which were to be purchased
directly by Alpine was set up and established solely by Alpine.
Petitioner had no input or involvement in that decision.

Once

Alpine made the determination to purchase certain materials, Alpine
issued the Change Order for such materials and the purchase price
of the materials together with the sales tax thereon was deleted
from the Petitioner's subcontract.

Alpine, through Dr. Jacklin,

would then authorize Mr. Sherm Wankier, an employee of Alpine
School District and the School District's chief Purchasing Agent,
to execute a purchase order to be sent to the material supplier.
Alpine undertook responsibility to order the materials, made sure
the correct quantities were ordered and that the materials were
delivered in conformance with the critical path schedule (Tr. 14 0141) .

The material supplier would then deliver the materials to

4

See Addendum 4 Attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof.
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the Project site and not to the Petitioner.

After the delivery,

the Petitioner in company with Alpine's Employees Dr. Jacklin and
Mr. Holden identified the relevant materials so that there would
be no question as to whether the materials were delivered without
damage.

(Tr. 140.)

When Dr. Jacklin determined that the proper

materials had been delivered without damage, Dr. Jacklin would then
authorize Alpine to issue a check for payment of the materials.
Mr. Greg Holbrook, another employee of the School District then
issued an Alpine check directly to the material supplier to pay for
the materials.

The materials were then delivered to Petitioner's

care to be installed into the structure.

(See Stipulated Facts,

R. 212-215, No. 306, 11-12, 25-33; Add. 40, 42, 46; Findings of
Fact 10, 18-20; Add 5-7; Tr. at 66-78, 131-132, 146; Holden Depo. ,
in Record as P-7, at 3-16.)

There is no evidence in the record to

suggest that these Alpine employees worked at the direction of the
Petitioner or under his control with respect to any of these
duties.
VI.
CONCLUSION
The

facts

of

this

case

establish

contract was subject to Change Order.

that

the

Petitioner's

There is no question that

the Change Order was actually made to Petitioner's contract and all
materials that Alpine School District had elected to directly
purchase

were

deleted

from

responsibilities to "furnish."

the

scope

of

Petitioner's

The initial contract entered into
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between the Petitioner and the General Contractor on the Project,
Poulsen-Ellsworth Construction Company, was superseded by a second
written agreement which did not include materials that would be
purchased by Alpine.

The materials which would be purchased by

Alpine were simply removed and deducted from the contract except
with respect to paragraph J, paragraph 2 0 of the Supplementary
Conditions providing for "Direct Purchases by School District.11
The Tax Commission's legal conclusion that Petitioner remained
responsible to furnish materials that would be purchased by the
School District despite the Change Order to the Petitioner's
contract

is unsupported

by

any

evidence.

This

bare

legal

conclusion of the Tax Commission is contrary to law and the
testimony

of the Project

Engineer, Mr. Dennis Cecchini, who

testified that the changes resulted in the Petitioner having an
"installation only" contract.
None of the cases cited by the Respondent apply to this case
because they are distinguishable with respect to these critical
facts: (1) in each of the cases cited by the Respondent, the
contractor, not the tax exempt entity, was the actual purchaser of
the materials in question; (2) in each of the cases cited by the
Respondent

there were

no

Change

Orders

to

the

Contractor's

agreement which removed responsibility to purchase materials that
would be purchased by the tax exempt entity; and (3) none of the
cases

cited

by

Respondent

dealt

"installation only" contracts.
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with

contractors

who

had

The identity of the purchaser of the materials determines
whether the sales tax exemption is available to Alpine. In Chicago
Bridge

& Iron

Company, supra,

the Utah Supreme Court observed that

the key taxable event is a purchase of materials by a real property
contractor for later installation. The Petitioner did not purchase
the materials for which the sales tax has been assessed, rather,
the materials were purchased by Alpine.

Therefore, Petitioner is

not the responsible entity for the tax.
The Respondent's assertion that Alpine became the Petitioner's
"purchasing agent" is not supported by anything in the record.
First,

there

was

not

Petitioner and Alpine.

even

a

contractual

agreement

between

Further, Alpine maintained control with

respect to the materials that would be purchased, filled out
purchase orders for purchase of the materials, delivered checks to
material suppliers and dealt directly with all material suppliers.
There is absolutely nothing in the record which indicates that
Alpine took orders from the Petitioner with respect to purchase of
materials.

The mere fact that the Petitioner inspected materials

upon receipt in company with Alpine's employees does not create an
agency relcttionship.
Finally, the Respondent has failed entirely to address the
Petitioner's argument that the Tax Commission violated the state
statute and the Utah Constitution by imposing a tax on Alpine
School District as a tax exempt entity. The Respondent has simply
ignored Petitioner's argument that the Tax Commission in effect
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redirects tax monies back to the general fund for redistribution
and away from the entity intended by the Legislature in violation
of the Utah Constitution, Article VI, §1, Article X, §§1 and 5;
Article XIII, §12(3) and U.CA. § 53A-16-101 (Add. 153-158).
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the
decision of the Tax Commission and order that Alpine's purchases
of school construction materials are tax exempt.
DATED this 30***

day of October, 1992.
Respectfully Submitted
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN

Brintori
Burl
Brinton R.
R. Burbidge
Merrill F. Nelson
Blake T. Ostler
Attorneys for Petitioner
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